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THE POLITICAL UNITY OF EUROPE: A 
DREAM, OR A REALITY IN THE 
MAKING? 
Mario Patrono*
“It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” Oscar Wilde 
 
The political unity of Europe is something that most people today see as purely hypothetical, 
or at the very least, remote: the future appearance on the world stage of a Europe unified politically 
as well as economically; a Europe that will at last have become a unitary political entity. Many (but 
not the author) exclude it from the ambit of current political possibility. For some, it is desirable; 
for others, frightening. This paper considers the "when", and the "if", of European unification – 
questions to which the eventual coming into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, the text of which was agreed toon 18 June 2004, does not provide an answer. 
L'unification politique de l'Europe est un événement que la plupart des gens regardent comme 
purement hypothétique ou dont l'avènement ne devrait se réaliser que dans un avenir lointain: 
l'entrée sur la scène mondiale d'une Europe unifiée politiquement aussi qu'économiquement; une 
Europe qui sera finalement une entité politique unitaire. Beaucoup l'excluent complètement comme 
possibilité politique actuelle. Pour les uns, il est désirable; pour les autres, effrayant. Cet article 
considère les questions «quand», et «si», en ce qui concerne l'unification européenne, questions 
auxquelles i’entrée en vigeur éventuelle de la traité établissant une constitution européenne, agréé 
le 18 juin 2004, ne répond pas.  
The study undertaken here falls within the sphere of "predictive jurisprudence" as defined by 
Giuseppe Guarino.1 "There are", Guarino explains, "two levels on which to place oneself when 
'doing law': that of the jurist who applies, and that of the jurist who proposes". An exercise of the 
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latter sort draws not only on personal intuition, but also on acquired experience, and in my case on 
the conviction that any prediction of the constitutional structure of the united Europe should be 
based on its actual development over time, rather than on ideas from the past or ideological 
prejudice. 
Let us consider the questions of when and whether the political integration of Europe will be 
achieved. From a legal point of view, determining when the process of integration of the states that 
currently make up the European Union (EU) will be completed raises a problem, the solution to 
which is anything but simple. 
When will the united Europe come into being? The first answer that springs to the mind of the 
constitutional lawyer is this: the emergence of a united Europe will occur upon the transformation of 
the treaty that binds the member states of the European Community (EC) into a true federal 
constitution – or more exactly, into the constitution of a federal European state – at which point the 
states themselves will completely abandon their own independence. If this answer were correct, it 
would simplify everything. 
But an answer of this kind (apparently the only one possible, if a constitutional lawyer is to give 
it) is doubly flawed: first, when it describes the process of integration by reference to legal 
structures – a federal constitution, a federal European state – that Europe will probably never have, 
without the process of political integration (if it happens) being impeded by them. When I was a law 
student at the University of Rome, a great professor of mine, Riccardo Orestano, taught me that 
legal concepts are a bit like drugs: those that are targeted to the condition do good, and the others 
bad; because concepts, like drugs, have a high cost: for drugs, a biological cost; for concepts, the 
risk of not understanding how things are in reality, especially if that reality is a completely new one. 
Why do I say this? For the very simple reason that I consider it an error, in interpreting the 
process of European integration, to look back at federal or confederal models of the past. Life moves 
forever ahead; new situations emerge all the time. The present situation is completely new: we have 
never before seen, for example, an integration where a single market and economic and monetary 
union do not follow political unity but precede it, and maybe even overshadow it. It seems to me, 
therefore, that when we consider the way in which European integration presents and will present 
itself, the confederation/federal state dichotomy need not concern us, or need only concern us 
indirectly and for the purposes of contrast.2
Let us consider the current situation. The launch of the euro on 1 January 2002 was the 
culmination of a historical experiment of great economic and legal importance, which began in 1957 
  
2  The traditional view finds its origins in Franz Neumann ("On the Theory of the Federal State" in Herbert 
Marcuse (ed) The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory (Free 
Press, New York, 1957) 216, 229): "[I]f one decides that one must go beyond confederation and yet 
maintain the existing state structure, obviously only the federal state remains as a possibility." Neumann 
maintained this thesis even before the Treaty of Rome had been signed. 
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with the Treaty of Rome: the voluntary delegation by sovereign states to a supranational 
organisation, the EC, of the hugely ambitious task of building a single market among European 
countries. Six members at first; 25 now, following the Treaty of Copenhagen of 13 December 2002 
and the admission of 10 members on 1 May 2004; and a further two, Romania and Bulgaria, in 
2007. 
Naturally, the market which is now manifested in the EU could not have reached such a high 
level of integration (but would have eventually become much weaker and more fragmented) if 
economic integration had not been accompanied by a similarly high degree of legal integration. This 
second sort of integration has been the work of community institutions – in particular, the Court of 
Justice and the Commission – and to a lesser extent of the founding Treaties, which themselves 
contain a unifying impulse. 
In crude terms, EC law – unlike that of "classical" confederations – reaches into the domestic 
legal systems of the member states and acts directly as a regulator of interpersonal relations, and as a 
source of law that domestic courts and bureaucracies are bound to apply, even in the face of 
incompatible domestic law (including incompatible constitutional and human rights norms).3 Both 
derived from the founding Treaties, these two intertwined elements of community law – its 
supremacy and direct effect – have been joined by a third: the binding power of interpretation of the 
European Court of Justice, which now makes it the final arbiter of national as well as Community 
laws.4  
The interplay of these three elements represents the legal aspect of the single market: a body of 
individual rights and liberties in constant fermentation; rights and liberties protected by the EC legal 
system. Community norms – said the Court of Justice in 1978 – are "a direct source of rights and 
duties for all those affected thereby, whether Member States or individuals, who are parties to legal 
relationships under Community law".5 It should immediately be added, to complete the description, 
that the legal system of the EC guarantees the protection of fundamental rights, at least to the extent 
that an essential nucleus of such rights forms part of the "general principles of law protected by the 
Court of Justice".6 In the Court's view, this nucleus of rights is derived, first, from the 
"constitutional traditions common to the Member States",7 and, secondly, from the provisions of the 
  
3  See the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [2000] ECR I-69, on the similar conclusions of Advocate-General La Pergola.   
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5  Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal Spa [1978] ECR 629. 
6  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
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7  Case 4/73 J Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1974] 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950.8 It follows that measures incompatible with the respect for human 
rights recognised and guaranteed in that way cannot be permitted within the Community.9 
Moreover, the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, gave the force 
of law to these legal principles, establishing that:10  
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law. 
On the subject of citizenship rights, the Maastricht Treaty went even further: both in setting out 
the basic elements of citizenship of the Union,11 and in anticipating the adoption by member states 
of a charter "to strengthen or to add to the rights laid down in this Part". 
And not before time, the Nice European Council of December 2000 concluded with the 
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A compromise was 
reached: "yes" to the Charter of Rights in terms of political consensus; "no", for the moment, to the 
insertion of the Charter itself in the Treaty on European Union. 
What we have seen, therefore, is an ideological anticipation of rights, the binding legal value of 
which will in time be fully revealed, and which every individual will be able to have protected in 
court, but only following the third major revision of the Treaty (after Maastricht and after 
Amsterdam); that is, after the adoption of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
From a legal point of view, the difference between the "before" and the "after" of the future 
insertion of the Charter into the Treaty on European Union is subtle but important: before, the 
Charter provides the EC judge with an instrument with which to interpret the common constitutional 
traditions of the member states; after, it will instead be the common constitutional traditions that 
will constitute an instrument with which to interpret the Charter. This is not the place in which to 
analyse this difference; the fact is that the Charter has already been invoked in judgment in the first 
of the two senses indicated. In The Queen v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte 
  
8  Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. 
9  Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 
Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v Dimotiki Étairia Pliroforissis (DEP) and Sotirios Kouvelas 
[1991] ECR I-2925. 
10  Treaty on European Union (7 February 1992) 1757 UNTS 30615, art 6 para 2. 
11  Art G sets out a series of rights including the right of every citizen of the Union residing in a state of which 
he or she is not a national to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the member state in 
which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that state. 
  
 THE POLITICAL UNITY OF EUROPE: A DREAM, OR A REALITY IN THE MAKING? 333 
Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union,12 Advocate-General Tizzano in 
his opinion of 8 February 2001 urged the Court of Justice to consider that when fundamental rights 
are at issue, "the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be ignored".13
Rights; instruments for the protection of human rights; citizenship. As we have seen, the seed of 
a European constitution (in the essential sense of a law that protects rights) has already sprouted 
within the Community legal system. 
The European Community, as we all know, operates within a larger entity, the European Union. 
The EU rests on three "pillars": one main pillar – the EC – and two smaller ones – common foreign 
and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; with so-called "bridges" 
from one pillar to another. The EU has a two-limbed structure: one limb is the sphere of 
intergovernmental cooperation relating to common foreign and security policy; the other is the legal 
system of the EC, which as we have just seen is a highly complex structure, within which the 
individual occupies an absolutely central position.  
Foreign policy in the EU is itself divided into two parts: commercial foreign policy, and foreign 
policy in the narrow sense; each governed in the Treaties by different but overlapping rules. The 
solution adopted in the field of foreign policy would therefore seem to lie halfway between an 
intergovernmental approach and communitisation. On the one hand we find the High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who acts for the Council; and on the other, the 
Commissioner for External Relations, who is concerned above all with commercial relations. There 
is thus a whole field of commercial foreign policy that is to some extent communitised; and there is 
also foreign policy in the narrow sense, which is instead administered at the intergovernmental level. 
My concern here is with foreign policy in the narrow sense. 
This is a necessarily brief, and certainly incomplete, account of the structure of the EU. But it is 
worth making, since without such a frame of reference the peculiarities of the European construction 
are not easily understood. I reaffirm at this point my conviction that the political integration of 
Europe is not limited by confederal or federal experience of the past, and reject the approach of 
Hughes and others since, who have tended to find in the concept of "confederation" an explanation 
of every intermediate association of states between the simple international union of states and the 
  
12  Case C-173/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Broadcasting, 
Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union [2001] ECR I-4881. 
13  See the similar views of Advocate-General Jacobs in Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v 
Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-6677 para 38. On the meaning and legal effect of the Charter, 
see A Manzella "Un Catalogo dei Diritti" [2001] 1 Il Mulino 34; Franz C Mayer "La Charte Européenne des 
Droits Fondamentaux et la Constitution Européenne" [2003] 2 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 175; 
Anna Rosa Cosi "The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Multilevel Legal Context" [2003] 
1 La Comunità Internazionale 109.
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centripetal federal state.14 The concept of confederation is of more limited importance than that. It 
grew out of a desire to explain, at a time of prevailing statism, how states could by means of an 
international treaty commit themselves to the joint conduct of foreign affairs and defence, entrusting 
the management of them to a single organ, representative of the member states, and operating 
initially on the principle of unanimity and, more recently, qualified majority.  
The EC/EU is almost the mirror image of a confederation: unlike a confederal legal system, 
which governs only the member states, a communitarian legal system also governs individuals and 
protects their rights; a confederal system has a monist structure with a central representative body, 
while the institutional structure of a communitarian system is pluralist; in a confederation the 
member states yield their sovereignty in foreign policy and defence to the confederation, which 
exercises it through the states, while in the EU foreign policy remains a state power, which it is 
nevertheless convenient to exercise jointly where the states themselves reach general agreement 
around a common position.15 As for a federal state, it is first and foremost a state: as such, its public 
administration is distributed throughout the entire national territory: something that Europe will 
probably never have, not even after having attained political integration. 
Let us return now to the first of the questions I raised at the outset of this paper. When, in legal 
terms, will the united Europe emerge? I indicate here three new stages in the process of integration. 
Stage 1: Foreign policy is integrated into the Community method. In general terms, the 
European Union is a simple container, an entity which cannot be identified with the Communities 
but comprises them, as well as the two lateral pillars. It is a European Union without legal 
personality, nor its own organs of government (if one excludes the Council of Europe), nor its own 
legal system distinct from that of the European Community. The EU is essentially a connecting 
system for the various Communities, operating on the basis of cooperation. If anything, its 
architecture would seem to reveal a secret desire among the member states, or some of them, to 
thwart any future European integration. The thing to do in light of this is as simple (remembering 
that simple does not mean easy, nor currently possible) as it is pivotal for the future of Europe. The 
thing to do is to remove the disjunction between the EU and the EC by adding foreign policy and 
defence to the competencies of the communitised Europe. Only then will Europe be able to speak 
with a single and genuinely authoritative voice. 
Stage 2: Majority decision-making in foreign policy and defence. It is highly probable that the 
member states will wish to preserve for as long as possible the principle of unanimity in important 
matters of foreign policy. Unanimity, Tomaso Perassi explained,16 gives every member state the 
  
14  Christopher Hughes Confederacies: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the University of Leicester 8 
November 1962  (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1963). 
15  On these various aspects of "classical" Confederations, in comparison with the characteristics of the EU, see 
A La Pergola "Sguardo sul Federalismo e i suoi Dintorni" (1992) 3 Diritto e Società 491-519. 
16  Tomaso Perassi L'Ordinamento delle Nazioni Unite (Cedam, Padua, 1957) 25. 
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possibility of blocking through its negative vote a decision which it considers contrary to one of its 
interests. The negative vote of a single state prevents a proposal from being adopted by the group, 
even if approved by all other states. The thing is, however, that decisions taken in this way can 
never be truly durable. While politics (understood as a way of giving life to contrasting views) 
divides by its very nature, a unanimous vote masks a kind of "antipolitics", where any decision that 
divides – that is, every political decision – is avoided at all costs. The member states of the EU will 
in time realise that foreign policy becomes unmanageable when entrusted to an organ that makes its 
decisions on the basis of unanimity, and will return to voting by majority (the alternatives of 
withdrawal from the Treaty and of secession being totally out of the question: European integration 
is a one-way street). 
Stage 3: The European Parliament manages foreign policy. This change will face even greater 
resistance, since the member states will fiercely oppose the idea of extending the European 
Parliament's powers of decision and control in line with the expanded Community competence in 
foreign policy and defence. Their opposition to the idea of involving the European Parliament in the 
management of foreign policy will undoubtedly be based on the oft-repeated argument that the 
ratification of Community decisions on as highly-charged a subject as foreign policy must remain 
the role of the national parliaments, since it is in the national parliaments, rather than in the 
European Parliament, that the true democratic centre of gravity of European integration resides. 
Nevertheless, this argument can never be a strong one. It will be nothing but a last-ditch attempt 
to protect states that will by then be well aware that associating the European Parliament with the 
conduct of foreign policy is the decisive step towards the goal (yearned for by some, opposed by 
others) of European integration: that is, the end of the independence of the member states, and their 
absorption into a general legal system (even though not of a federal state, or rather, even though not 
of a state) corresponding to the whole of their territories. 
It is clear that the process of integration will not be concluded, at a procedural level, without a 
parallel adjustment of the institutional structure of the Community. Currently, at the centre of the 
communitarian system – and by "centre" I mean a body capable of receiving the impulses of the 
member states and working them into a framework of general interests held by the collective – we 
find the Commission. This deliberative and executive body – a cabinet for the Community – is 
something the Community could not easily do without. The Commission operates as a "neutral 
zone" among the disparate and often contrasting national interests (particularly in the area of 
competition), and as such is essential now, and will be in the future, to the good functioning of the 
Community machine. The Commission, together with the Court of Justice, has been the chief driver 
of the process of integration, and an essential driver before the states came to understand that the 
national interest and the common interest are not mutually exclusive, but are – ultimately – allies. In 
this respect, the Commission is needed now more than ever before, to hold together a Community 
made up not of different peoples, but of different worlds. When Community life had no "political" 
dimension in the proper sense of the word, the Commission could fulfil this unifying function. 
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Starting with the Maastricht Treaty, however, the EU has begun to assume a strongly political 
character; destined, moreover, to grow over time. The institutional balance of the EU is moving, 
step-by-step and almost inadvertently, in ways that it is not possible to clarify here. 
Having answered, albeit in broad terms, the question of when, legally speaking, the process of 
European integration will be completed, we now face another, inevitable question of much greater 
range and depth: namely, whether Europe will be integrated. I pose it tentatively, well aware, among 
other things, that the evolution of political structures is not a matter of simple arithmetic. But it is 
worth venturing an answer. 
The typical response is "Yes, Europe will be integrated, but only in the presence (dies incertus 
an et quando) of a powerful 'federator'"; and by this is meant a serious and imminent danger which 
threatens Europe directly and demands centralised government as the only way of confronting the 
situation. In the absence of such a danger, the argument goes, the European construction is destined 
to remain one of economic cooperation among states, albeit close and highly sophisticated economic 
cooperation. What sort of danger we might be looking at is never articulated openly, leaving the 
imagination to run to hypotheses as catastrophic as they are unlikely: it could be the presence of 
some external threat which jeopardises the cultural identity of Europe, if not peace itself (this is the 
"enemy at the gates" hypothesis, which in turn raises the idea of "fortress Europe"); or an attack in 
grand style of international terrorism; or a tidal wave of migration, forcing governments to put up 
the shutters on Europe. Scenes worthy of a horror film. Stupidities. If this is what European 
integration means, the birth of the united Europe is destined never to happen; and we will be all the 
better for it. 
I would observe instead that there is already in Europe a powerful federating force with a 
strongly pacific character: the internal market. I should note, however, that when I speak of the 
common market as the principal integrating force within the countries of the EU (a force that in the 
near future will be as potent as it has been in the past) I do not have the slightest intention of being 
understood to sustain a thesis that I consider utterly unsustainable: namely, that political integration 
and a common market are corequisites. The thesis goes like this: if it is true that the process of 
integration among previously independent states is necessarily accompanied by the formation of a 
common market, so (this is the unsustainable bit) must the opposite be true: political integration 
must follow, sooner or later, the formation of the common market. This argument I consider frankly 
wrong. While a desire for political integration has already been satisfied when a state proceeds to 
the creation of a domestic market, in the case of a regional market, political integration does not 
figure – as a rule – in the intentions of the signing states; in fact it is directly rejected in a number of 
treaties. Furthermore, if the thesis were true, we could expect to find as many political unions as 
there are regional markets operating and overlapping in the world today. 
Admittedly, the economic integration that has occurred in Europe under the auspices of the EC 
can be distinguished from other similar experiences by two characteristics: the drive towards 
political unity, and the frameworks and legal structures necessary for the formation of the integrated 
  
 THE POLITICAL UNITY OF EUROPE: A DREAM, OR A REALITY IN THE MAKING? 337 
market. None of the regional markets currently in operation – not Mercosur, nor Nafta, nor the 
similar African ones – was born as a means to the end of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
the states parties, while that is precisely the function assigned to the European Economic 
Community right from the start; where the High Contracting Parties proposed in the Preamble of the 
Treaty of Rome to "lay the foundations", through the institution of a common market, "of an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe".17 The European idea stands at the dawn of the common 
market, it constitutes its background and its frame of reference. This is the same "European idea" of 
which the Preamble of the Single European Act speaks in its fourth paragraph, when it recognises 
the need for it to correspond to "the wishes of the democratic peoples of Europe".18 This is the way 
in which the common market and economic and monetary union have grown and developed, even in 
the face of a thousand obstacles and delays, propelled by the conviction that the goal to be reached, 
the goal which gets closer step-by-step, is "the construction of the future Europe".19
The second characteristic that distinguishes European economic integration from other 
experiences is the fact that the ever greater degree of economic integration, which has now reached 
a peak that will not easily be equalled, has made use of the combined and contemporaneous action 
of structures and legal tools already provided for (some in only embryonic form) in the founding 
Treaty. These structures and tools – the Commission, the Court of Justice, the preliminary reference, 
the direct effect of community norms, and the avenues of challenge available to individuals – have 
operated as a growth factor in the process of integration. 
It is these two characteristics, an ideal and a technique, one fused to the other, that have made 
the common market a potent federating force, the natural consequence of which is the political unity 
of Europe. Let us see how. 
My hypothesis (a hypothesis sustained also by the functionalists, and shared at least in part by G 
Federico Mancini)20 is grounded in the firm belief that the absence of political integration in Europe 
has a high cost in terms of development and economic growth. This, I suggest, is true from two 
perspectives. From the internal point of view, it is a fact that economic integration has been realised 
with respect to monetary policy, but not fiscal policy. At the level of monetary policy, we find a sole 
supranational authority, the European Central Bank, bound to conserve the stability of prices while 
maintaining a low rate of inflation. Fiscal policy instead remains broadly the responsibility of the 
national governments, within limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. As for indirect 
taxation, which impacts immediately on the end consumer, the burden is very different from country 
to country, and the harmonisation administered by the Commission has shown itself to be weak, 
  
17  Treaty on European Union, above n 10, art 1. 
18  Single European Act (1986) OJ L169/87. 
19  Treaty on European Union (7 February 1992) 1757 UNTS 30615, preamble. 
20  G Federico Mancini "Argomenti per uno Stato Europeo" [1998] 1 Sociologia del Diritto 7-27. 
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difficult to achieve, and able to affect rates, smoothing out the worst inconsistencies, but not also the 
prices of goods themselves.21 It is obvious that the absence of uniform, and therefore unitary, fiscal 
policy seriously distorts competition. Indirect taxation yields different prices for a single good on 
the Community market, creating a deep imbalance in the "open market economy with free 
competition" that inspires or should inspire – by virtue of articles 4 and 98 of the EC Treaty – the 
actions of the Community and of the states in the field of economic policy. Economic integration as 
currently realised in Europe is a rather one-legged affair. 
If, having renounced their monetary power, the member states also decided to renounce their 
power in fiscal matters, then economic policy would be managed no longer at a national level, but 
rather at a European level. A single economic policy presupposes a single general policy, because 
the trends of general policy are intertwined with economic policy; and a single policy in Europe 
presupposes a single European government to develop and apply it. 
On the other hand, it is undeniable that in the competitive coexistence of economies, whether 
they be national or regional, the trust of international markets plays a very important role (whether 
positive or negative).22 The credibility of an economy on the world market is a function of two 
variables: its productive capacity, and the politico-diplomatic authority enjoyed by its government 
and legal system.23 Only a great authority of Europe as a whole, greater than that of the most 
"powerful" of its member states, is truly capable of exploiting the potential of European economic 
integration, ensuring that its supply of goods, services, and capital is matched by adequate external 
demand. 
It seems to me, moreover, that this hypothesis of the market as a federating force can be 
reconciled with the widely-held belief that economic globalisation should be accompanied by some 
form of political globalisation. If some of the most serious problems that globalisation is alleged to 
have caused (attracting criticism and opposition of various kinds – which themselves are globalising 
and institutionalising) derive from the current situation of "governance without government", then 
  
21  The instability of the harmonised EC system in respect of indirect taxation is evident upon a simple reading 
of two recent judgments of the Court of Justice: one in Case C-345/99 Commission of the European 
Communities v French Republic [2001] ECR I-4493, the other in Case C-40/00 Commission of the 
European Communities v French Republic [2001] ECR I-4539, both of 14 June 2001 and both concerned 
with article 17(2) of the Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977, 77/388/CEE, on the harmonisation of the 
laws of the member states relating to turnover taxes (common system of value added tax: uniform basis of 
assessment): OJ 1977 L 145, 1, in the version resulting from Council Directive 95/7/EC of 10 April 1995 
amending Directive 77/388 and introducing new simplification measures with regard to value added tax. 
22  On this point see Yves L Doz "Politiche dei Governi e Settori Industriali Globali" in Michael E Porter (ed) 
Competizione Globale (ISEDI, Turin, 1987) 243, 294 (original title Competition in Global Industries 
(Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1986)). 
23  And, Gaetano Quagliariello observes (rightly, in my view), military authority: "O l'Europa si Arma o 
Resteremo Sempre Nani" (4 April 2003) Il Messaggero 1. 
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there should be as much of a need for unitary government on the regional scale as on the world 
scale. 
But there is a problem. Many of the most learned commentators (especially German 
commentators) insist that European integration is for now an impossible goal, because the 
fundamental premise – a single European people – is lacking, and because only a single people can 
give itself a constitution.24 Europe, it is said, is an agglomeration of ethnic groups, a collection of 
nations pervaded by patriotic sentiments and jealous of their diversity, a mixture of peoples 
lukewarm on any suggestion of amalgamation, even after economic integration has been achieved; 
proud, separated by language, history, culture, and sometimes even by religion (if one thinks about 
the blood spilt in Northern Ireland). 
But this is not the reality. We have come a long way since the 1950s and 60s, when the states of 
Europe were rigidly defensive of their own sovereignty; petty, blind, aggressive, self-centred; when 
De Gaulle pushed for a Confédération des Patries; when scrawled on the interiors of British trains 
was the saying "God made man and He was happy; God made woman and He was happy; God 
made De Gaulle and he is still crying!". The ideology of europeanism is becoming ever more 
widespread and deeply rooted among young Europeans. There is even some indication – God forbid 
– of the development of a kind of European nationalism.  
The emergence among the people of Europe of a politics that can be described as truly 
"European", rather than merely national, is only a few years off. European politics will in turn 
strengthen the identity of the European people; it will counter the myopia of national interests and 
jealousies; it will help to reduce the democratic deficit that has always afflicted the Community; it 
will allow the European populace to assume a dominant and influential role in the business of the 
Union, through a Parliament that will at long last have real decision-making power, including the 
power of approving or rejecting proposals to modify the Treaties. This will be the revolution on the 
road to European integration: only then – and not an instant before – will the passage from 
legitimation by rights to democratic legitimation be complete. 
What I have just said about the common market as a potent federating force, and in particular 
about the fact that a European people is already alive and visible and supported by a comprehensive 
body of fundamental rights, does not mean at all that European political integration is inevitable, or 
that it is simply a question of waiting for it to happen. On the contrary, there are many obstacles on 
the road from economic Europe to political Europe. One example is the close alliance between the 
  
24  This is the view, for example, of Dieter Grimm in the third section of his most recent book Die Verfassung 
und die Politik: Einsprüche in Störfallen (Beck, Munich, 2001); and also of Peter Häberle "Per una Dottrina 
della Costituzione Europea" (1999) 19 Quaderni Costituzionali 3, especially para 1.2.1, where he discusses 
the absence of a public European dimension founded on a set of minimum common values and principles; 
see also, on the role of the populace in the formation of a democratic constitution, C Pinelli Il Momento 
della Scrittura: Contributo al Dibattito sulla Costituzione Europea (Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002) 79. 
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United Kingdom and the United States, which undoubtedly inhibits the formation of a Community 
foreign policy distinct from that of America. Another might be the eventual entry into the EU of 
Turkey, whose culture is markedly different from that of the existing "Europe" (if not necessarily 
incompatible with it). But perhaps the biggest obstacle is the ballast that weighs down every process 
of integration: the resistance of the political and legal elites of the individual states to the sudden and 
comprehensive re-sizing of their role and status which would accompany the end of national 
sovereignty; resistance that is perhaps more serious and recalcitrant in Europe than elsewhere. 
Heads of state and of government, Ministers, and superior-court judges of the member states of the 
EU, who today represent their states in various international institutions, will lose that privilege 
when the process of European integration comes to fruition. The thing they fear most is not so much 
the reduction of state power – after all, it has been a continuous and increasingly marked feature of 
all five Treaties since 1957, to the point where no less a constitutionalist than Anthony Bradley 
questions whether the famed sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster still exists in fact,25 and 
Sabino Cassese and Giuseppe Guarino speak openly of the European states as "post-states".26  What 
those elites fear most is that state power will become so highly circumscribed that their respective 
states can no longer be described as "states" at international law, nor they themselves as "state" 
officials. What they fear, in other words, is the loss not only of the noun in the expression "state 
power", but also of the adjective. The governments of the various European countries, all inheritors 
of proud political and cultural traditions, are undoubtedly anxious to cultivate deep and diffuse 
feelings of national pride as a way of preserving their status and the prerogatives that go along with 
it. Reluctantly will they sign the death warrants of the nation states of Europe, short of being 
constrained to do so by the force of economics. 
How much time might be needed before we will see a politically united Europe, no-one can say. 
But Europe cannot wait indefinitely, its people are dreaming happy dreams of what might be. The 
political integration of Europe is not some vague future event, it is no longer a night without stars; it 
is close to realisation. But the answer to the "when?" question is not something that can be 
determined objectively. I see it ultimately as a choice: one of Goethe's "elective affinities". 
 
  
25  "The Sovereignty of Parliament - in Perpetuity?" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) The Changing 
Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 79-107. 
26  Giuseppe Guarino Il Governo del Mondo Globale (Le Monnier, Florence, 2000); Sabino Cassese La Crisi 
dello Stato (Laterza, Bari, 2002). 
  
